Preface
The period between December 1992 and March 2001 was a time of transition for monetary policy in Norway. Over that period, the Norwegian authorities moved away from the objective of maintaining a fixed exchange rate against a currency index, and replaced it with a floating exchange rate within an inflation targeting regime. This paper documents Norges Bank's role in this process.
A collection of documentation papers covering selected areas and processes of change are being elaborated in the framework of Norges Bank's 2016 Bicentenary Project. The Bank has engaged both current and former employees to participate in this work. The assistance from experts on different themes is particularly useful since a complete catalogue of the source material for the more recent change processes in the Bank is not yet available. However, it is important to avoid that the documentation papers solely represent the "authors' view" of the events. The main goal of the papers is to provide a guide for historians when consulting the Bank's archival materials. Documenting actual events is therefore more important than their analysis.
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The initiative for writing this paper was taken by the current Deputy Governor of Norges Bank, Jan F. Qvigstad. Qvigstad played a prominent role in Norges Bank in the process under review in this paper. Both Qvigstad and the historian Einar Lie have provided the author with invaluable advice and guidance in the writing process.
It should be noted that the focus of this paper is on Norges Bank's role in the transition period from a fixed exchange rate regime to inflation targeting. Historians that are writing the full history of monetary policy in Norway between 1992 and 2001 must also be provided with access to material from relevant key institutions, such as the Government, the Ministry of As a backdrop, I first provide an account of a number of relevant events and developments in the period from the Second World War to the time Norway was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime on 10 December 1992.
The first months of a floating exchange rate (page 8)
Section 2 documents Norges Bank's analyses in the period between December 1992 and summer 1993, when the rationale for a fixed exchange rate policy still predominated within the central bank.
Reorientation within Norges Bank (page 12)
From autumn 1993 key employees of Norges Bank started reviewing the question of the operational target of monetary policy, which was part of the process leading to the establishment by the authorities of a new and more flexible exchange rate target in May 1994. The paper provides an account of the main players and meetings involved in the discussions on this issue.
Exchange rate stability versus real economic stability (page 20)
In 1996, tensions arose as to whether the key policy rate should primarily be used to stabilise the exchange rate or to stabilise the Norwegian economy and inflation. At this point, economists at Norges Bank had also started to elaborate a concrete operational framework for inflation targeting. The Bank shared its newly acquired knowledge of a floating exchange rate with other institutions, particularly academics. I describe the central bank's strategy and document the key events of the process.
The currency turbulence in autumn 1998 (page 27)
In August 1998, Norges Bank started giving greater weight to inflation than to exchange rate stability in interest rate setting. The paper provides an account of the
Norwegian exchange rate policy from the Second World War to December 1992
Historically, monetary policy in Norway was geared towards maintaining a fixed exchange rate using various approaches. 4 After the Second World War, the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was established where the US dollar functioned as an anchor for inflation. The international monetary system functioned in an environment of fairly synchronised economic cycles and inflation across participating countries, and its stability relied on extensive control of capital movements. When the system collapsed at the beginning of the 1970s, Norway decided to participate in the EEC's exchange rate targeting regime where the Deutsche Mark served as the nominal anchor. Owing to a desynchronisation of economic cycles following the oil crisis in 1973, inflation in Norway could no longer be restrained at the low level prevailing in Germany. After four successive devaluations of the Norwegian krone in an attempt to recoup a competitive loss, the Norwegian authorities decided to leave the system in December 1978, and instead sought to maintain a stable exchange rate against an index including the currencies of Norway's main trading partners.
However, Norway was not able to keep inflation in line with the average level among trading partners into the 1980s. Several small devaluations and "technical adjustments" to the krone were made to compensate for this. The authorities' response pattern was subsequently incorporated into expectations and was itself inflationary. Eventually, it was recognised that the costs associated with an inflationary environment were too high. After a major devaluation in May 1986, triggered by a fall in oil prices, exchange rate policy was tightened again. 5 The exchange rate was to be maintained within a narrow range and not adjusted frequently. This hard currency policy was to bring down inflation and pave the way for lower interest rates.
Tight control of capital movements facilitated the pursuit of a fixed exchange rate policy in the postwar period. Moreover, foreign exchange controls made it possible to pursue a nationally oriented interest rate policy and credit policy. Interest rate changes were decided politically under this system. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, this system came under 4 Several economists have read drafts of this paper and have commented and proposed improvements. I would like to thank Krister Andersson, Sigbjørn Atle Berg, Jarle Bergo, Harald Bøhn, Øyvind Eitrheim, Svein Gjedrem, Amund Holmsen, Jan Tore Klovland, Torstein Moland, Jon Nicolaisen, Arent Skjaeveland, Kjell Storvik, Lars Svensson, Bent Vale, and Birger Vikøren. I would also like to thank Helle Snellingen for translating the Norwegian text into English. All remaining errors and omissions are the responsibility of the author. 5 See Kleivset 2011 for a study of Norwegian exchange rate policy 1971-1986. pressure. 6 The hard currency policy pursued as from 1986 in effect removed interest rate setting from political control.
As a main rule, the Governor of Norges Bank took the decision to change interest rates when it was deemed necessary to do so in order to support the krone exchange rate. Before the decision was made it had to be submitted to the Ministry of Finance. 7 Nonetheless, it was largely an automatic decision during the period where monetary policy operated with narrow fluctuation margins for the exchange rate. The provision for operating this policy was set out in the general authorisation of the Executive Board of Norges Bank. The Executive Board was therefore not involved in the monetary policy decisions. The Board primarily dealt with overarching economy policy matters, often in relation to consultation processes.
In Norges Bank's communication of the orientation of monetary policy, the role of the Governor was clearly distinct from that of the Executive Board. The Governor could speak fairly boldly both to the media and in his annual address to the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank. When Norges Bank's Executive Board expressed its views on a matter, primarily in the form of a letter submitted to the Ministry of Finance, there was seldom any divergence between its views and official policy.
Norway succeeded in maintaining a fixed exchange rate against the exchange rate index from 1986 to the end of the decade. In 1990, the krone was again linked to the EC currencies within the framework of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). Norway's return to exchange rate cooperation within the EC, which at that time was a unilateral decision without the intervention support that would have followed from EC membership, was partly motivated by the new impetus to European integration as a result of the fall of the Berlin wall and the reunification of Germany. A number of countries had joined the ERM in 1990. The Norwegian authorities expected that linking the krone to the ERM would lower risk premiums on the krone and hence reduce interest rates. However, the reunification of the two Germanies gave rise to a demand shock. The German central bank responded with interest rate increases, which had an adverse impact on a number of countries participating in the ERM. When operators in the foreign exchange market discovered this, heavy pressure arose on devaluation-prone currencies. An additional factor was the preceding wave of deregulation of capital markets. Technological advances had also reduced transaction costs, which led to an increase in short-term capital flows. 8 As a result, a number of countries were compelled to allow their currency to float in the course of the summer and autumn 1992.
The krone also fell victim to market pressures. Norges Bank responded with interventions and sharp interest rate hikes. On 10 December 1992, the Bank succumbed and the krone was allowed to float.
As a result of the ERM crisis in autumn 1992, many countries introduced a new operational target for monetary policy, shifting focus from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate system. Without defining a different intermediary target, such as money supply, the interest rate was set with the aim of achieving price stability, defined as low and stable inflation. Some countries outside Europe had already introduced such a regime before 1992.
New Zealand was the first to do so in 1989 and Canada followed suit in 1991. These countries became an example to, for instance, the UK and Sweden, which introduced an inflation targeting regime in 1992 and 1993, respectively.
In Norway, however, the notion of a fixed exchange rate as an anchor for the economy also figured prominently after the currency turbulence in autumn 1992. This reflected the division of responsibility for economic policy in Norway. Svein Gjedrem explained this in his first annual address as central bank governor on 18 February 1999:
In New Zealand, Australia and many other countries monetary policy is oriented directly towards price stability, and these countries permit short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate. This means that monetary policy bears the primary responsibility for price stability, whereas fiscal policy is to a greater extent oriented towards longterm stability in government finances.
[…] Many countries are struggling with government finances. After several years of large government budget deficits, interest expenditure is laying claim to a considerable portion of tax revenues and thereby limiting the government's scope for carrying out its tasks. The main challenge to fiscal policy is to eliminate these deficits and reduce government debt and interest expenditure.
Norway has had greater fiscal scope for manoeuvre, although this has not solely been used to promote long-term balance. Therefore, Norway established a different division of responsibility for economic policy. As the objective of monetary policy is to maintain a stable exchange rate, fiscal policy has an important responsibility for stabilising the economy.
In Norway incomes policy played an important role, while in other countries it was of little relevance. In his first annual address, Governor Gjedrem elaborates on this aspect:
High wage growth cannot be attributed to flaws in wage and income determination. On the contrary, the flexible wage and income system can probably be cited as the main factor behind the high level of employment and low unemployment in Norway.
In periods of strong labour market pressures, particularly in 1974-1976, 1986-1987 and last year, wage growth accelerates sharply. Such periods are normally followed by a slacker labour market and higher unemployment. The positive feature of income determination in Norway has been that wage growth returns to normal relatively quickly, which has allowed Norway to avoid the persistently high levels of unemployment experienced by most West European countries. Even though some increase in unemployment must be expected, we should be able to avoid a rise in unemployment to European levels or to the level prevailing in the period 1989-1992 if wage and cost inflation is rapidly reduced also during this business cycle.
In an article in Aftenposten 4 May 1999, Governor Gjedrem expressed the following:
There are considerable differences between Norway and other industrial countries in the structure of the economy, the organisation of decision-making processes and the formulation of economic policy. In Norway, income and wage determination is fairly centralised; a number of fora to foster cooperation between the social partners have been established, as has special legislation which makes it easier to resolve labour conflicts than in many other countries. The central government budget is used more actively to stabilise economic developments, partly because the Norwegian state has substantially greater economic leeway than other countries.
The first months of a floating exchange rate
On 11 December 1992, the day after the fixed exchange rate for the Norwegian krone had been suspended, In Norway, when the 30-day period neared an end, the conditions were still not in place for returning to a fixed exchange rate policy. It was therefore decided by Royal Decree of 8 January 1993 that the krone would be allowed to float until further notice. In a government memo, a three-phase approach for monetary and exchange rate policy was drawn up. In the first phase, Norges Bank would attempt to buy back some of the foreign exchange that had been lost in the support interventions conducted in autumn. In phase two, a more fixed range In autumn 1993, Norges Bank also prepared a Festschrift for Hermod Skånland, who was soon to retire as central bank governor. 32 Inflation targeting was among the subjects of several of the contributions in the book, which was published in January 1994. 33 The book received widespread publicity in the media and in academic circles. 34 In Norges Bank's submission on economic policy for 1994, the Bank's Governor and Deputy
Governor, Hermod Skånland and Kjell Storvik, wanted to give weight to price stability as an explicit long-term objective of monetary policy. This view met with opposition in the Ministry of Finance. 35 After Norges Bank's Executive Board had discussed the draft submission, the text on monetary policy was therefore adjusted. As mentioned earlier, it had been standard practice throughout the post-war period for Norges Bank's Executive Board to be very cautious about, or preferably avoid, publicly advising changes in economic policy if interviews that had been planned, the Economics Department introduced the concept of "noninflationary growth". The department held the view that a situation had presented itself where it would be possible to "sell the advantage of price stability to the public".
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For the Government, incomes policy cooperation played a key role in achieving low price and cost inflation. Against the background of an official report on employment challenges in Norway, the Government and LO (Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions) had agreed on a strategy to ensure wage moderation in the years ahead. 39 As quid pro quo for wage moderation, the government would set aside funds for job creation measures. The solution was called the "Solidarity Pact". The view that incomes policy cooperation could ensure low price and cost inflation generated less optimism at Norges Bank. Governor Skånland had previously been involved in working on this issue, but had to some extent lost faith in this approach after the period of high cost inflation in Norway in the 1970s. 40 Norges Bank's forecasts from 1993 reflected some scepticism as to whether the social partners would be able to restrain wage and price inflation in Norway when labour market pressures increased.
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Based on its assessments of the division of responsibility for economic policy, the Ministry of Bank, Svein Gjedrem, described the challenges posed by exchange rate interventions in the 1990s:
From a somewhat longer term perspective the experience of large-scale and persistent interventions is mixed. When the central bank intervenes heavily to defend the krone, market participants may easily move into a game situation and perceive central bank intervention as an interesting opportunity to make a profit. Market operators know that a situation in which the krone is perceived as "artificially strong" because Norges Bank is buying kroner cannot persist. It is then tempting to take reverse positions in the foreign exchange market in relation to the central bank. This means that heavy and prolonged interventions may be self-reinforcing over time, steadily increasing the necessary volume of intervention purchases required to maintain the krone exchange rate.
The foremost example of such a game situation in Norway's exchange rate policy history was Friday, 20 November 1992 when we made intervention purchases for NOK 37 billion from the time the market opened until the market closed.
Norges Bank does not want to intervene in such a way that this type of game situation arises. However, the Bank will use interventions if the krone moves substantially out of line with what we consider to be reasonable based on fundamentals or in the event of exceptional short-term volatility. It may also be appropriate to reinforce a desired development in the exchange rate that has already been observed in the market. In such a situation, it is assumed that the risk of ending up in a game situation against exchange market players is marginal. However, we must take into account that the krone exchange rate cannot in the long run deviate substantially from the level implied by economic fundamentals.
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As the Ministry of Finance had announced that it would review the issue of the orientation of monetary policy in the Revised National Budget in spring 1994, the Economics Department in Norges Bank prepared a strategy document with "stops" plotted in for the winter and spring.
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After Torstein Moland took office at the beginning of the year, the first stop was the annual address in February. In his address, the new Governor followed up Skånland's message from the previous year about the need to define a long-term monetary policy objective even under a floating exchange rate regime and that this objective should be price stability. The speech and the market response were discussed in a memo from the Market Operations Department. It was pointed out that it would be difficult for market participants to have confidence in a price stability objective in Norway because there was no tradition of giving weight to price stability as an objective in the formulation of Norwegian economic policy.
The low level of inflation at this time could not be said to reflect a specifically Norwegian desire for low inflation, but rather a combination of low activity in the Norwegian economy and tight monetary policy in the last few years of the fixed exchange rate regime.
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The Norwegian authorities had succeeded in keeping the krone exchange rate relatively stable after the ERM crisis in 1992 and 1993. Nonetheless, a permanent and credible solution for the orientation of Norwegian monetary policy would eventually have to be found. In spring 1994, prior to the adoption of the Revised National Budget, a number of meetings were held between the Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank where these issues were addressed. 47 The representatives of the central bank were of the opinion that an exchange rate target still was recommendable, provided that some more flexibility should be allowed with regard to shortterm fluctuations in the exchange rate, and as long as the long-term objective for monetary policy was price stability. 48 The Ministry of Finance was still sceptical about explicitly giving monetary policy responsibility for price stability. The turbulence in 1992 in particular had shown that a unilateral fixed exchange rate regime with tight fluctuation margins was not sufficiently robust now that capital movements had been fully liberalised. Speculation against the krone had to be made less tempting. The new Regulation provided for more flexibility, as Norges Bank had called for. 50 However, the main responsibility for keeping wage and price inflation at a competitive level was still assigned to incomes policy, while fiscal policy was to be used to smooth the business cycle.
Even though the Norwegian authorities did not establish an inflation target in May 1994, a fairly broad understanding had nonetheless formed in the Government and the Storting that low inflation was a precondition for achieving economic policy objectives and that the various policy components had to pull in the same direction to achieve this. during the upturns in the two previous decades, which could in the next round undermine the preconditions for maintaining a stable krone exchange rate.
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Of particular concern to Norges Bank at that time was the risk that monetary policy could have a pro-cyclical effect during an upturn. Subject to the prevailing regulation, the interest rate had to be set at a low level to counteract an appreciation of the krone exchange rate.
Torstein Moland has later asserted that he "exchanged a few words with Minister of Finance
Sigbjørn Johnsen" about this matter in spring 1995. The Minister is then said to have indicated that "the Ministry was aware of the matter".
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The risk that the focus on a stable krone exchange rate could become too rigid was mentioned again in the February 1996 annual address, this time by Kjell Storvik, who had taken over as Norwegian economy was often out of sync with trading partners in the EU. A more independent interest rate policy might be necessary, as experienced after the reunification of Germany earlier in the decade. At the same time, Storvik highlighted the risk of allowing fiscal policy to bear the full burden of stabilising the economy as this might lead to public finance imbalances, thereby eroding the more long-term basis of economic policy. In the interest of ensuring economic efficiency and a predictable policy framework, there were limits to the scope for tax and benefit changes. This became even clearer in a world of free capital movements.
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The shift in many countries away from a fixed exchange rate as the operational target of monetary policy at the beginning of the 1990s came with the recognition that this policy was not necessarily consistent with economic stability. These countries had experienced substantial changes in the real exchange rate, or the real price of goods and services relative to trading partners. With a credible objective of low inflation anchored in the domestic economy, the exchange rate could be allowed to appreciate or depreciate as necessary and contribute to economic stability. As an oil exporter, Norway was particularly exposed to changes in its terms of trade.
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Storvik and Norges Bank continued to express concern about developments in the Norwegian economy through spring 1996. It appeared that the annual wage settlement would be more expensive than in the preceding years, and the central bank expressed the view that this constituted a clear departure from the policy of wage moderation, i.e. the Solidarity Pact. At the same time, sizeable tax revenues provided room for higher government spending, which would increase pressures in the economy. In a confidential letter to the Minister of Finance, 
The currency turbulence in autumn 1998
In late summer and autumn 1998, there was a renewed conflict between ensuring exchange rate stability and promoting economic stability. For the second time since the introduction of the exchange rate regime in May 1994, market pressure forced the Norwegian authorities to allow the krone to float from its loosely defined range.
At the beginning of August, the krone was at around 105 against the ECU, which was weaker than it had been for a long time. 94 The global crisis in financial markets took a turn for the worse that month, driving large capital movements and an outright flight from less liquid currencies to currencies perceived as "safe havens". Consequently, the Norwegian krone also depreciated. After having intervened with krone purchases at the beginning of the month, on 12 August, Norges Bank chose to raise its key rate by half a percentage point. 95 The depreciation pressure dissipated for a few days, but the krone resumed its decline the following week. Money markets promptly expected that the central bank would respond by raising the key policy rate by a further half percentage point.
In an attempt to demonstrate that Norges Bank was serious about stabilising the krone exchange rate, the Governor argued for a bigger rate increase than market participants had priced in. 96 Before the markets opened on Friday 21 August, it was decided that the key policy rate would be raised by one and a half percentage points to seven percent. 97 However, the krone remained weak throughout the day Friday, despite heavy interventions. Right before currency trading closed for the weekend, Norges Bank registered a virtually limitless offer of NOK at asking price, and the Bank had to withdraw from the market. 98 Over the weekend, several meetings were held by the central bank administration and with senior civil servants in the Ministry of Finance. It was considered irresponsible to use largescale interventions to resist the pressure, since this might become self-reinforcing and potentially involve substantial losses, as had been the case in autumn 1992. There also seemed to be little purpose in a sharp interest rate increase as it could not be sustained over time. Use of the emergency provision of the Exchange Rate Regulation appeared to be the only relevant response to a continued fall in the krone. The focus of the discussions was therefore at what exchange rate the krone would be allowed to float and the interest rate level the Bank should maintain.
Norges Bank's management and administration argued for giving weight to the interest rate level that could help to stabilise the Norwegian economy. Eight percent was deemed adequate to dampen inflation expectations over the long term. This would be in the order of around three percentage points over the corresponding ECU rate, a risk premium Norges Bank believed that the Norwegian economy could live with for a while.
The Ministry of Finance was seeking to determine the interest rate level that would be compatible with gradually returning the krone to its initial range. At meetings between the Bank and the Ministry, Ministry representatives expressed the view that the interest rate should be set somewhat higher than eight percent. 99 Nevertheless, Norges Bank would remain firm in its view, and the weekend's discussions concluded with an agreement on an interest rate level of eight percent. However, the Ministry of Finance made certain to emphasise that the objective of monetary policy remained unchanged and that the interest rate level chosen was intended to gradually return the krone to its initial range. With regard to the timing of allowing the krone to float, the Ministry and the Bank agreed that allowing a substantial depreciation of the krone before invoking the emergency provisions would weaken the credibility of the system. The threshold for abandoning the intervention was set at an ECU index of 107.
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During the morning hours of Monday, 24 August, the krone depreciated, quickly approaching the agreed float rate on the index. At noon, the threshold was crossed, and the Governor 99 Jan F. Qvigstad was present at the meetings between Norges Bank and the Ministry of Finance. 100 Minutes of the meeting of Norges Bank's Executive Board, 27 August 1998.
immediately submitted the matter to the Ministry of Finance by telephone. 101 The decision to raise the key policy rate to eight percent and the suspension of the use of instruments until further notice was announced shortly afterwards.
The decision to raise the interest rate by one percentage point on 24 August 1998 was made by the Governor with the general authorisation of the Executive Board, after the matter had been submitted to the Ministry of Finance. After the Bank stopped operating within a narrow band after December 1992, there was more room for discretion in setting the interest rate. In time this paved the way for the subsequent participation of the Executive Board in monetary policy decision-making. Such a change in decision-making practice was endorsed in summer 1998 in a memo from Bernt Nyhagen, the Bank's general counsel, where it was pointed out that under the Norges Bank Act, interest rate decisions should be made by the Executive Board as a body. 102 On the basis of Nyhagen's memo, new routines were agreed upon at a working dinner on 19 August 1998 where the Executive Board would be convened in connection with interest rate decisions whenever possible. The substantial rate increase of one and a half percentage points on Friday, 21 August, was approved at a plenary meeting, under time pressure before the market opened.
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As we have seen, it was expected that Monday, 24 August, would bring a rate increase and that the krone would be allowed to float. Thus, that morning, in line with the new routines, a meeting of the Executive Board was called for 2:00 pm the same day. But the krone depreciated below the agreed float threshold before that time, and the Governor therefore made the decision with the general authorisation of the Executive Board. The planned meeting of the Executive Board at 2:00 pm was cancelled. Following the decision on Monday, 24 August to allow the krone to float, some media commentators began to raise doubts about whether Norges Bank was pursuing an objective of a stable krone exchange rate. Governor Storvik tried to refute these speculations in an address to foreign exchange traders at FOREX Norway on 28 August. 105 Several times in the course of the speech, the Governor insisted that the suspension of instruments was in accordance with the Exchange Rate Regulation and that the authorities' goal was for the krone to gradually return to its initial range.
However, confidentially to the Ministry of Finance, Storvik left no doubt as to his opinion about the monetary regime in force. In a draft of a letter to Minister of Finance Gudmund
Restad, which was drawn up on the basis of the discussions over the weekend 22 and 23
August, the Governor wrote:
I have concluded that the crisis at hand is largely attributable to the present exchange rate regime, which by its nature invites speculation against the currency. In addition, this regime forced us to pursue an expansionary monetary policy through 1997, which in itself has aggravated the current situation. Developments in international financial markets -including repeated, successful attacks on various fixed exchange rate regimes in the 1990s -suggest in my view that the monetary policy objective of a stable exchange rate in Norway has lost market credibility.
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During the first days after the Norwegian authorities decided to suspend the use of interest rate increases and interventions, the krone depreciated sharply. On the day before Storvik's address to the foreign exchange traders, it reached 115.2 against the ECU, a record low to date after the krone was forced to float at 100 in December 1992. To the authorities' relief, the krone subsequently appreciated somewhat. In September, it stabilised to some extent, moving within a corridor of between 108.5 and 111.5.
Even so, the turbulence in foreign exchange markets was not over, and from the end of September, it contributed to a renewed depreciation of the krone. At Norges Bank, further depreciation was regarded as particularly undesirable, since it could result in sharp 105 Address to the annual general meeting of FOREX Norway, 28 109 Further use of the interest rate as a means of preventing exchange rate movements in the very short term was deemed out of the question. This was still believed to be counterproductive, since it was not credible or sustainable over time. 110 A press release was issued in which the Bank pointed out that it regarded the depreciation of the krone as excessive and that it would resume foreign exchange trading in its conduct of monetary policy.
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The depreciation pressure from the end of September and beginning of October was primarily attributed to developments in international financial markets in the wake of the Asian crisis and the emerging crisis in Russia, with possible contagion to Brazil and the rest of Latin America. 112 International investors fled from risky to safer alternatives. However, there was also uncertainty regarding the Norwegian economy, including oil price and fiscal policy developments. 113 If, despite interventions, the krone were to show a marked tendency to weaken further, Norges Bank would have to consider whether more extensive use of instruments would be compatible with the Exchange Rate Regulation and appurtenant guidelines. 114 At the same time as these scenarios were being discussed, the Executive Board completed its discussion of the Bank's submission on the 1999 Budget Bill. Members of the Executive Board were bound by a duty of non-disclosure regarding Board business. However, some members found some of the particulars so difficult that they needed to consult with their alternates before making a decision. 122 The Governor and Deputy
Governor took a dim view of this practice, which they believed compromised the integrity of the Bank's policymaking body. 123 Storvik later described the Executive Board that he had chaired as a "miniature of the Norwegian parliament": "Board members were not allowed opinions at variance with the parties they represented. Thus, decisions were made outside the Executive Board".
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The question of the exchange rate regime was discussed further at the meeting of the Executive Board on 24 November. 125 However, no decision was taken to advise the government at this meeting either. Even so, the members agreed that the Governor could be requested at short notice by the Minister of Finance to make his views known before the Executive Board would be able to reconsider the matter. There was an understanding that the Governor's advice in that situation would be in accordance with the recommendations in the Economics Department memo submitted the week before -that is, a recommendation to adopt an inflation target.
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Interventions to support the krone continued through November, and the reserves set aside were quickly reduced. Norges Bank to try to clarify what was to be done now. 128 At the meeting of the Executive Board on 9 December, Storvik pointed out that only external circumstances, such as higher oil prices or a stabilisation of international financial markets could return the krone to its range.
He warned against basing monetary policy on such an eventuality taking place. Storvik recommended that the Board advise the government to switch to an inflation targeting regime and for this advice to be given as expeditiously as possible. 129 The Board did not reach agreement this time either on advising the government, despite the strong urgings of the Governor. NOK 15 billion of extra allocation still remained unused for exchange rate intervention. According to the minutes, the discussion would continue at the next meeting.
On the following day, 10 December, a meeting was held between Norges Bank's management and administration and the Ministry of Finance. According to Jarle Bergo, the Ministry's representatives stated emphatically that they were familiar with the views of Norges Bank's management, but that political considerations dictated that they would be unwilling to accept advice at this juncture. It was argued that the government would be put in "a very difficult situation" if Norges Bank advised it to change the monetary policy regime.
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On 14 December, the Executive Board met again. The krone had depreciated in the preceding days. NOK 2 billion of the additional allocation of NOK 15 billion had been used. The exchange rate regime question was no closer to resolution. At the meeting, the Governor presented the outline of a possible decision invoking that Norges Bank's was to make it known when there is a need for measures to be taken by others than the Bank in the field of monetary, credit or foreign exchange policy. Following a discussion, the Executive Board again decided to defer such a decision. Present at that meeting was Svein Gjedrem, who would become Governor at the turn of the year. 131 However, he was "merely an observer at this point, and did not take part in the discussion". fundamental conditions for exchange rate stability over time […] There are two fundamental conditions necessary for achieving stability against European currencies. First, price and cost inflation must fall to the level aimed at by euro countries. A high rise in prices and costs will in itself fuel depreciation expectations. Monetary policy must therefore be oriented with a view to bringing price and cost inflation in Norway down to the inflation target in Europe.
[…] Second, interest rates must not be set at such high levels that monetary policy contributes to economic downturns that undermine confidence in the krone.
[…] When both fiscal policy and monetary policy are oriented with a view to influencing the domestic economy, it is important that the two components of economic policy are complementary. However, there is a risk that a situation may arise where Norges Bank maintains a high interest rate level based on its evaluation of the economic outlook, while the government authorities increase spending in order to stimulate employment. This is a genuine dilemma.
In view of its mandate and responsibilities, the best way for Norges Bank to address this challenge is probably to promote transparency in its analyses and reaction patterns so that the government authorities can take into account the implications for Norges Bank's setting of interest rates when decisions concerning the government budget are taken. The objective of monetary policy and Norges Bank's remit are drawn up by the political authorities. It is essential that fiscal policy play an effective role for monetary policy to be successful.
These are the same arguments that had recurred in the annual addresses of the three previous governors, Skånland, Moland and Storvik.
The fall in market rates in January permitted a reduction in the key policy rate towards the end of the month. Therefore, on 28 January, Norges Bank lowered the rate by half a percentage point. The decision was made at a plenary meeting of the Executive Board. The fact that Committee. 149 As mentioned, Storvik and Bergo had attended a similar meeting in January 1998, at which various bank economists presented data from their areas of concern. As from 1999, analogous meetings were scheduled in Norges Bank, called "reviews of recent developments" in connection with interest rate decisions. These reviews lasted three to four hours, and all departments were asked to present and comment on recent data. This drew Norges Bank's departments more closely into the interest rate decision process.
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Developments in 1999 were favourable for the Norwegian economy. There was a moderate wage settlement, and oil prices rebounded. This helped to strengthen the krone, returning it to its initial interval. The key policy rate was reduced in several steps; in September it was at five and a half percent. The new discretion in setting the interest rate was put to the test for the first time following the wage settlement in spring 2000. Norges Bank chose to raise the interest rate while a proposed settlement reached by LO/NHO was being voted on. 151 The LO chief economist, Stein Reegård, went on the offensive against Gjedrem, pointing out that Norges Bank had to take more than the inflation outlook into consideration in its interest rate setting. 152 Gjedrem defended the decision by arguing that inflation in Norway was expected to be higher than in Europe, which would eventually have a destabilising effect on the Norwegian economy. 153 The rate increase was also controversial because in spring 2000, the krone was strong against the euro. But with greater acceptance of exchange rate fluctuations, Norges Bank would permit further appreciation as long as there was pressure on real economic resources and there were prospects of higher inflation.
Work continued on issues related to monetary policy regimes at Norges Bank. In spring 2000, a group of academics, primarily from Norway this time, were invited to analyse Norwegian monetary policy. There was still a divergence in attitudes towards inflation targeting among Norwegian economists. Advocates of an inflation target argued that the margin of manoeuvre in monetary policy could be increased if the political authorities issued a clear mandate for the central bank. 154 Again, the opposing camp pointed to the uncertainty of whether incomes policy cooperation could continue after the adoption of an inflation target. 155 The contributions were published the same year in the book Perspektiver på pengepolitikken (Perspectives on monetary policy), edited by Jan F. Qvigstad and Øistein Røisland.
In the course of 2000, oil prices rose considerably. Since 1996, the Norwegian authorities had been setting aside portions of the government's oil revenues in a government petroleum fund. 156 The added revenue resulting from higher oil prices increased pressure to spend "oil money". This would eventually exert further pressure on an already tight Norwegian labour market, pushing up price and cost inflation. Because the projections for the following years showed large budget surpluses, the Ministry of Finance began work on the principles for oil revenue spending. Norges Bank was not involved in the work. 157 The solution the Ministry of Finance arrived at, which eventually gained broad support in the Storting, involved gradually phasing in oil revenues into the Norwegian economy in an amount equal to the expected real return on the petroleum fund. This fiscal rule thus gave fiscal policy a more long-term aim.
Moreover, the rule allowed the authorities to spend more than the real return when the economy was weak and less during good times. The Ministry of Finance did acknowledge, however, that there were limits to how effectively fiscal policy could be used to stabilise the economy. In this connection, the Ministry also decided to introduce an inflation target for monetary policy, so that monetary policy assumed some of fiscal policy's responsibility for stabilising the economy. 158 The result was a new division of responsibility for Norwegian economic policy.
This meant that Norges Bank was given a clear mandate, its responsibilities were clearly spelled out and reporting routines were systematised. 159 For the actual setting of the key policy rate, the formal policy change was less important, "since a monetary policy response pattern was already in place that was consistent with an inflation targeting regime", as
Gjedrem subsequently put it. 160 Norges Bank was not aware that the Government was planning a formal change to the Bank's mandate in late winter 2001. Section 2 of the Norges Bank Act, referred to as the instructions section, confers upon the Bank the right and the duty to state its opinion before resolutions regarding the operations of the Bank are passed. The Ministry of Finance thus sent a draft of a new regulation to Norges Bank, with a request for comments to be returned almost immediately. 161 Gjedrem, Bergo, Qvigstad and Nicolaisen subsequently drafted a letter, which was later approved by the Executive Board. 162 Thus, the requirement for involvement under the Act had been complied with. The Stoltenberg Government's white paper on new guidelines for economic policy, including a fiscal rule and inflation target, was approved by
